The Relationship Between Changes in Mindfulness and Subsequent Changes in Well-Being Following Psychedelic Use: Prospective Cohort Study.

This study demonstrates that changes in mindfulness predict subsequent changes in well-being in a data set including individuals who recently engaged in psychedelic use.

Is maxillary sinusitis and radiographic maxillary sinus opacification associated with an altered microbiology of MRONJ?

OBJECTIVE: Maxillary sinusitis can be a sequela of medication-related osteonecrosis of the jaw (MRONJ). This study aims to characterize the microbiome of maxillary MRONJ with concurrent maxillary sinusitis and radiographic maxillary sinus opacification to determine if there is a relationship between the microbiome of MRONJ and sinus disease. STUDY DESIGN: This retrospective case series was conducted using electronic health records from the University of Pennsylvania and affiliated hospitals. The target population was surgically managed maxillary MRONJ patients. The primary predictor variables were tissue culture results. The primary outcomes were maxillary sinusitis or maxillary sinus opacification. Statistical analysis was performed using chi-squared tests at the 95% confidence interval. RESULTS: Thirty-nine subjects were selected: 25 had sinus opacification and 11 had sinusitis. Resident bacteria were present in 90% of subjects, nonresident bacteria in 74%, and opportunistic organisms in 15%. There were significantly more subjects with chronic sinusitis microbes (79%) than without. There were significantly more gram-positive anaerobes, specifically Propionibacterium, as well as the gram-negative facultative anaerobe, Capnocytophaga, in subjects with concurrent sinusitis. CONCLUSIONS: Maxillary MRONJ with concurrent maxillary sinusitis may be associated with gram-positive anaerobic species, Propionibacterium, and Capnocytophaga colonization. Maxillary MRONJ patients may benefit from sinus evaluation and concurrent surgical intervention.

Intervening on high-risk responses during ecological momentary assessment of suicidal thoughts: Is there an effect on study data?

Ecological momentary assessment (EMA) is increasingly used to study suicidal thoughts and behaviors (STBs). There is a potential ethical obligation for researchers to intervene when receiving information about suicidal thoughts in real time. A possible concern, however, is that intervening when receiving responses that indicate high risk for suicide during EMA research may impact how participants respond to questions about suicidal thoughts and thus affect the validity and integrity of collected data. We leveraged data from a study of adults and adolescents (N = 434) recruited during a hospital visit for STBs to examine whether monitoring and intervening on high-risk responses affects subsequent participant responding. Overall, we found mixed support for the notion that intervening on high-risk responses influences participants' ratings. Although we observed some evidence of discontinuity in subsequent responses at the threshold used to trigger response-contingent interventions, it was not clear that such discontinuity was caused by the interventions; lower subsequent responses could be due to effective intervention, participant desire to not be contacted again, or regression to the mean. Importantly, the likelihood of completing surveys did not change from before to after response-contingent intervention. Adolescents were significantly more likely than adults, however, to change their initial suicidal intent ratings from above to below the high-risk threshold after viewing automated response-contingent pop-up messages. Studies explicitly designed to assess the potential impact of intervening on high-risk responses in real-time monitoring research are needed, as this will inform effective, scalable strategies for intervening during moments of high suicide risk. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

Random effects won't solve the problem of generalizability.

Yarkoni argues that researchers making broad inferences often use impoverished statistical models that fail to include important sources of variation as random effects. We argue, however, that for many common study designs, random effects are inappropriate and insufficient to draw general inferences, as the source of variation is not random, but systematic.

Do Medical Insurance Companies Reimburse Telemedicine Office Visits the Same as In-Person Office Visits in an Academic Oral and Maxillofacial Surgeon Setting?

PURPOSE: The use of telemedicine has grown exponentially over the last decade, but its widespread adoption has been hindered, at least in part, by uncertainty over reimbursement rate for services. The aim of this study is to compare reimbursement rates of telemedicine and in-person visits in an academic oral and maxillofacial surgery practice. METHODS: The investigators implemented a retrospective cohort study. The sample was composed of patients who were treated by the oral-maxillofacial surgery service at the University of Pennsylvania Health System from March 17, 2020 to February 27, 2021. The primary predictor variable was the type of patient visit, either telemedicine or in-person. Patient status, either established or new, was a covariate. The outcome variable was the mean reimbursement-to-charge (RC) ratio. Descriptive and bivariate statistics were computed, and the P value was set at .05. RESULTS: This study included 6,082 submitted claims for 4,045 patients for in-person and telemedicine oral-maxillofacial surgery office visits. The mean reimbursement per insurance payor was $98.07 for a telemedicine visit (mean RC ratio = 0.48 with a standard deviation of ± 0.20) and $109.5 for an in-person visit (mean RC ratio = 0.50 with a standard deviation of ± 0.19). While there was a significant difference between the RC ratio for total telemedicine versus in-person visits (P = .001), the magnitude of the difference was only 2%. When stratifying the comparison by new (P = .73) and established patients (P = .20) for both telemedicine and in-person office visits, there was no significant difference in RC ratios. CONCLUSIONS: The results suggest that there are no major discrepancies in financial reimbursement rate between telemedicine and in-person office visits. Both methods of treatment may be financially effective for oral-maxillofacial surgery providers. Future studies can compare reimbursement rates among different insurance providers and among different institutions in the United States.

What comes to mind?

When solving problems, like making predictions or choices, people often "sample" possibilities into mind. Here, we consider whether there is structure to the kinds of thoughts people sample by default-that is, without an explicit goal. Across three experiments we found that what comes to mind by default are samples from a probability distribution that combines what people think is likely and what they think is good. Experiment 1 found that the first quantities that come to mind for everyday behaviors and events are quantities that combine what is average and ideal. Experiment 2 found, in a manipulated context, that the distribution of numbers that come to mind resemble the mathematical product of the presented statistical distribution and a (softmax-transformed) prescriptive distribution. Experiment 3 replicated these findings in a visual domain. These results provide insight into the process generating people's conscious thoughts and invite new questions about the value of thinking about things that are both likely and good.

Can Strategic Ignorance Explain the Evolution of Love?

People's devotion to, and love for, their romantic partners poses an evolutionary puzzle: Why is it better to stop your search for other partners once you enter a serious relationship when you could continue to search for somebody better? A recent formal model based on "strategic ignorance" suggests that such behavior can be adaptive and favored by natural selection, so long as you can signal your unwillingness to "look" for other potential mates to your current partner. Here, we re-examine this conclusion with a more detailed model designed to capture specific features of romantic relationships. We find, surprisingly, that devotion does not typically evolve in our model: Selection favors agents who choose to "look" while in relationships and who allow their partners to do the same. Non-looking is only expected to evolve if there is an extremely large cost associated with being left by your partner. Our results therefore raise questions about the role of strategic ignorance in explaining the evolution of love.

Mistiming of thought and perception predicts delusionality.

The timing of thoughts and perceptions plays an essential role in belief formation. Just as people can experience in-the-moment perceptual illusions, however, they can also be deceived about how events unfold in time. Here, we consider how a particular type of temporal distortion, in which the apparent future influences "earlier" events in conscious awareness, might affect people's most fundamental beliefs about themselves and the world. Making use of a task that has been shown to elicit such reversals in the temporal experience of prediction and observation, we find that people who are more prone to think that they predicted an event that they actually already observed are also more likely to report holding delusion-like beliefs. Moreover, this relationship appears to be specific to how people experience prediction and is not explained by domain-general deficits in temporal discrimination. These findings may help uncover low-level perceptual mechanisms underlying delusional belief or schizotypy more broadly and may ultimately prove useful as a tool for identifying those at risk for psychotic illness.

Cyclical population dynamics of automatic versus controlled processing: An evolutionary pendulum.

Psychologists, neuroscientists, and economists often conceptualize decisions as arising from processes that lie along a continuum from automatic (i.e., "hardwired" or overlearned, but relatively inflexible) to controlled (less efficient and effortful, but more flexible). Control is central to human cognition, and plays a key role in our ability to modify the world to suit our needs. Given its advantages, reliance on controlled processing may seem predestined to increase within the population over time. Here, we examine whether this is so by introducing an evolutionary game theoretic model of agents that vary in their use of automatic versus controlled processes, and in which cognitive processing modifies the environment in which the agents interact. We find that, under a wide range of parameters and model assumptions, cycles emerge in which the prevalence of each type of processing in the population oscillates between 2 extremes. Rather than inexorably increasing, the emergence of control often creates conditions that lead to its own demise by allowing automaticity to also flourish, thereby undermining the progress made by the initial emergence of controlled processing. We speculate that this observation may have relevance for understanding similar cycles across human history, and may lend insight into some of the circumstances and challenges currently faced by our species. (PsycINFO Database Record

Co-evolution of cooperation and cognition: the impact of imperfect deliberation and context-sensitive intuition.

How does cognitive sophistication impact cooperation? We explore this question using a model of the co-evolution of cooperation and cognition. In our model, agents confront social dilemmas and coordination games, and make decisions using intuition or deliberation. Intuition is automatic and effortless, but relatively (although not necessarily completely) insensitive to context. Deliberation, conversely, is costly but relatively (although not necessarily perfectly) sensitive to context. We find that regardless of the sensitivity of intuition and imperfection of deliberation, deliberating undermines cooperation in social dilemmas, whereas deliberating can increase cooperation in coordination games if intuition is sufficiently sensitive. Furthermore, when coordination games are sufficiently likely, selection favours a strategy whose intuitive response ignores the contextual cues available and cooperates across contexts. Thus, we see how simple cognition can arise from active selection for simplicity, rather than just be forced to be simple due to cognitive constraints. Finally, we find that when deliberation is imperfect, the favoured strategy increases cooperation in social dilemmas (as a result of reducing deliberation) as the benefit of cooperation to the recipient increases.

Normality: Part descriptive, part prescriptive.

People's beliefs about normality play an important role in many aspects of cognition and life (e.g., causal cognition, linguistic semantics, cooperative behavior). But how do people determine what sorts of things are normal in the first place? Past research has studied both people's representations of statistical norms (e.g., the average) and their representations of prescriptive norms (e.g., the ideal). Four studies suggest that people's notion of normality incorporates both of these types of norms. In particular, people's representations of what is normal were found to be influenced both by what they believed to be descriptively average and by what they believed to be prescriptively ideal. This is shown across three domains: people's use of the word "normal" (Study 1), their use of gradable adjectives (Study 2), and their judgments of concept prototypicality (Study 3). A final study investigated the learning of normality for a novel category, showing that people actively combine statistical and prescriptive information they have learned into an undifferentiated notion of what is normal (Study 4). Taken together, these findings may help to explain how moral norms impact the acquisition of normality and, conversely, how normality impacts the acquisition of moral norms.

A Simple Task Uncovers a Postdictive Illusion of Choice.

Do people know when, or whether, they have made a conscious choice? Here, we explore the possibility that choices can seem to occur before they are actually made. In two studies, participants were asked to quickly choose from a set of options before a randomly selected option was made salient. Even when they believed that they had made their decision prior to this event, participants were significantly more likely than chance to report choosing the salient option when this option was made salient soon after the perceived time of choice. Thus, without participants' awareness, a seemingly later event influenced choices that were experienced as occurring at an earlier time. These findings suggest that, like certain low-level perceptual experiences, the experience of choice is susceptible to "postdictive" influence and that people may systematically overestimate the role that consciousness plays in their chosen behavior.

Can you perceive ensembles without perceiving individuals?: The role of statistical perception in determining whether awareness overflows access.

Do we see more than we can report? Psychologists and philosophers have been hotly debating this question, in part because both possibilities are supported by suggestive evidence. On one hand, phenomena such as inattentional blindness and change blindness suggest that visual awareness is especially sparse. On the other hand, experiments relating to iconic memory suggest that our in-the-moment awareness of the world is much richer than can be reported. Recent research has attempted to resolve this debate by showing that observers can accurately report the color diversity of a quickly flashed group of letters, even for letters that are unattended. If this ability requires awareness of the individual letters' colors, then this may count as a clear case of conscious awareness overflowing cognitive access. Here we explored this requirement directly: can we perceive ensemble properties of scenes even without being aware of the relevant individual features? Across several experiments that combined aspects of iconic memory with measures of change blindness, we show that observers can accurately report the color diversity of unattended stimuli, even while their self-reported awareness of the individual elements is coarse or nonexistent-and even while they are completely blind to situations in which each individual element changes color mid-trial throughout the entire experiment. We conclude that awareness of statistical properties may occur in the absence of awareness of individual features, and that such results are fully consistent with sparse visual awareness.

Intuition, deliberation, and the evolution of cooperation.

Humans often cooperate with strangers, despite the costs involved. A long tradition of theoretical modeling has sought ultimate evolutionary explanations for this seemingly altruistic behavior. More recently, an entirely separate body of experimental work has begun to investigate cooperation's proximate cognitive underpinnings using a dual-process framework: Is deliberative self-control necessary to reign in selfish impulses, or does self-interested deliberation restrain an intuitive desire to cooperate? Integrating these ultimate and proximate approaches, we introduce dual-process cognition into a formal game-theoretic model of the evolution of cooperation. Agents play prisoner's dilemma games, some of which are one-shot and others of which involve reciprocity. They can either respond by using a generalized intuition, which is not sensitive to whether the game is one-shot or reciprocal, or pay a (stochastically varying) cost to deliberate and tailor their strategy to the type of game they are facing. We find that, depending on the level of reciprocity and assortment, selection favors one of two strategies: intuitive defectors who never deliberate, or dual-process agents who intuitively cooperate but sometimes use deliberation to defect in one-shot games. Critically, selection never favors agents who use deliberation to override selfish impulses: Deliberation only serves to undermine cooperation with strangers. Thus, by introducing a formal theoretical framework for exploring cooperation through a dual-process lens, we provide a clear answer regarding the role of deliberation in cooperation based on evolutionary modeling, help to organize a growing body of sometimes-conflicting empirical results, and shed light on the nature of human cognition and social decision making.

What Do People Find Incompatible With Causal Determinism?

Four studies explored people's judgments about whether particular types of behavior are compatible with determinism. Participants read a passage describing a deterministic universe, in which everything that happens is fully caused by whatever happened before it. They then assessed the degree to which different behaviors were possible in such a universe. Other participants evaluated the extent to which each of these behaviors had various features (e.g., requiring reasoning). We assessed the extent to which these features predicted judgments about whether the behaviors were possible in a deterministic universe. Experiments 1 and 2 found that people's judgments about whether a behavior was compatible with determinism were not predicted by their judgments about whether that behavior relies on physical processes in the brain and body, is uniquely human, is unpredictable, or involves reasoning. Experiment 3, however, found that a distinction between what we call "active" and "passive" behaviors can explain people's judgments. Experiment 4 extended these findings, showing that we can measure this distinction in several ways and that it is robustly predicted by two different cues. Taken together, these results suggest that people carve up mentally guided behavior into two distinct types-understanding one type to be compatible with determinism, but another type to be fundamentally incompatible with determinism.

Microbial carriage state of peripheral blood dendritic cells (DCs) in chronic periodontitis influences DC differentiation, atherogenic potential.

The low-grade oral infection chronic periodontitis (CP) has been implicated in coronary artery disease risk, but the mechanisms are unclear. In this study, a pathophysiological role for blood dendritic cells (DCs) in systemic dissemination of oral mucosal pathogens to atherosclerotic plaques was investigated in humans. The frequency and microbiome of CD19(-)BDCA-1(+)DC-SIGN(+) blood myeloid DCs (mDCs) were analyzed in CP subjects with or without existing acute coronary syndrome and in healthy controls. FACS analysis revealed a significant increase in blood mDCs in the following order: healthy controls < CP < acute coronary syndrome/CP. Analysis of the blood mDC microbiome by 16S rDNA sequencing showed Porphyromonas gingivalis and other species, including (cultivable) Burkholderia cepacia. The mDC carriage rate with P. gingivalis correlated with oral carriage rate and with serologic exposure to P. gingivalis in CP subjects. Intervention (local debridement) to elicit a bacteremia increased the mDC carriage rate and frequency in vivo. In vitro studies established that P. gingivalis enhanced by 28% the differentiation of monocytes into immature mDCs; moreover, mDCs secreted high levels of matrix metalloproteinase-9 and upregulated C1q, heat shock protein 60, heat shock protein 70, CCR2, and CXCL16 transcripts in response to P. gingivalis in a fimbriae-dependent manner. Moreover, the survival of the anaerobe P. gingivalis under aerobic conditions was enhanced when within mDCs. Immunofluorescence analysis of oral mucosa and atherosclerotic plaques demonstrate infiltration with mDCs, colocalized with P. gingivalis. Our results suggest a role for blood mDCs in harboring and disseminating pathogens from oral mucosa to atherosclerosis plaques, which may provide key signals for mDC differentiation and atherogenic conversion.